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Has the Dollar Depreciated?
While the dollar has depreciated strongly against
the currencies of mostof its trading partners that
are industrial countries, it has not depreciated
against the currencies of a large number of less
developed countries (LDCs). U.S. competitive-
ness therefore may not have improved as much
as suggested by the major indices ofthe dollar,
which only include the currencies of industrial
countries. This is the message conveyed by the
recently issued index of the trade-weighted
value ofthe U.S. dollar presented by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. According to the Dallas
Fed index, which weights the dollar's value
against the currencies of over 100 countries, the
value ofthe dollar adjusted for inflation has
fallen 13 percent since its peak in 1985, rather
than the 23 percent indicated by the narrow
Morgan index which compares the dollar with
the currencies of 15 major U.s. trading partners.
This Letter reviews the differences among alter-
native dollar indices and the rationale for those
indices. We also look at how the inclusion of
LDCs in a dollar index affects the measurement
ofthe dollar as well as the information conveyed
about the international competitiveness ofthe
United States.
Purpose of a dollar index
The value ofthe dollar is an indicator of the
competitiveness of U.S. goods in world markets.
As long as inflation in the u.s. and abroad are
not very different, a weaker dollar means that
u.s. goods will be cheaper in relation to foreign
goods, and consequently, that u.s. exports will
rise and imports fall, thus reducing the u.s.
trade deficit.
The recent drop in the dollar's value has not,
however, been uniform against all other curren-
cies. Since the first quarter of 1985, the U.S. dol-
lar has depreciated over 40 percent against the
currencies of a large number of industrial coun-
tries, including the German deutschemark and
the Japanese yen, but the u.s. dollar has
depreciated by much less against the Canadian
dollar, and has appreciated by large amounts
against the currencies of a number of LDCs.
To determine whether the dollar is stronger or
weaker on balance, and by how much, we need
to know what weight to assign to changes in the
dollar value of each currency. The resulting
weighted average measure ofthe dollar is
known as an effective exchange rate index.
What such an index will say about the value of
the dollar depends on (1) the weights assigned to
individual currencies and (2) the currencies
included in the index.
Assigning weights to currencies
In assigning weights to currencies in a dollar
index that seeks to assess u.s. competitiveness,
the largest weight should be given to the cur-
rency whose value will most affect the interna-
tional competitive position of the u.s. Most
indices assign a weight to a currency according
to the "size" of a country in U.s. export and
import markets. The widely used Federal Re-
serve Board's index measures a country's size
according to its total (exports plus imports) trade.
Because the weights in this index are based on
each country's trade with the rest ofthe world,
the index is called a "multilateral" trade-
weighted index. In contrast, the Morgan Guar-
anty and Dallas Fed indices assign weights ac-
cording to the size of U.s. total trade with each
country, and thus are known as "bilateral"
trade-weighted indices.
Empirically, it appears to make very little dif-
ference whether bilateral or multilateral indices
are used because the indices are highly corre-
lated. To focus discussion on the implications of
adding the currencies of LDCs to measures of
the dollar, the following will only compare the
Morgan and Dallas Fed bilateral trade-weighted
indices.
Currencies included in the index
Traditionally, indices ofthe dollar have limited
their coverage to the currencies of major indus-
trial trading economies on the grounds that
adding the currencies of LDCs does not give
much more information about u.s. competitive-
ness and, in some respects, could distort the
measurement ofthe dollar's value. There are two
reasons for possible distortion.
First, trade with LDCs has consisted largely of
primary products, which are generally priced in
U.s. dollars. Primary products are not very sensi-FRBSF
tive to variations in exchange rates because the
demand for such products is not very responsive
to price or exchange rate changes in the short
run. Furthermore, as a result of market imper-
fections in the trade for these commodities,
changes in exchange rates will, at least in the
short run, not necessarily be reflected in changes
in price. For example, heavy subsidies have
reduced the influence of exchange rates in
determining prices in the world market for agri-
cultural commodities.
Second, very high inflation rates in a number of
LDCs have resulted in very rapid depreciation in
their currencies. These large depreciations can
bring about large changes in the overall measure
ofthe dollar that is out of proportion to their
impact on U.s. competitiveness. For example,
the estimated appreciation of the u.s. dollar
against the Mexican peso of over 130 percent
in 1986 has tended to make Mexican goods
cheaper, as one dollar can now purchase many
more pesos than it could a year ago. However,
the resulting improvement in the competitive-
ness of Mexican goods was significantly offset
by the price increases associated with an esti-
mated Mexican inflation rate of 110 percent.
Notwithstanding the difficulties cited above,
recent developments in international trade raise
the question of whether measures of the dollar's
value should continue to exclude LDCs. The
share of LDCs in total U.s. trade rose from 28
percent in 1970to 34 percent in 1985, and
LDCs now supply 26 percent of all u.s. imports
of manufactured goods. Such goods are more
sensitive to exchange rate variations than are
primary products.
Given the lack of depreciation in a large number
of LDC currencies against the u.s. dollar, the
newly industrializing LDCs, especially, may
delay or reduce the improvement in the u.s.
trade balance by taking up some of the market
share conceded by industrial countries in U.s.
export and import markets. Thus, excluding the
currencies of LDCs from measurements ofthe
dollar may result in the omission of important
information about the international competitive-
ness of the United States.
Furthermore, the distortions introduced by infla-
tion on nominal measures of the dollar, can be
reduced by so-called "real" indices, which
include adjustments for inflation. Such adjust-
ments are particularly important when a dollar
index includes the currencies of LDCs with
higher inflation rates. However, even real
indices may not accurately reflect changes in
U.s. competitiveness because timely and satis-
factory data on inflation and exchange rates in
LDCs are often not available.
How the dollar indices behave
Charts 1 and 2 illustrate the behavior, in nomi-
nal and real terms, ofthree bilateral indices of
the dollar in the period 1983-86: (1) the Morgan
narrow index, which includes the currencies of
15 industrial countries accounting for approx-
imately 55 percent of the total u.s. trade, (2) the
Morgan broad index, which covers 40 countries,
including 22 LDCs accounting for nearly 90 per-
cent oftotal u.s. trade, and (3) the Dallas Fed
index, which, in its nominal version, covers 131
countries accounting for nearly 100 percent of
u.s. trade, and, in its real version, covers 101
countries.
Chart 1, which illustrates the nominal indices,
shows that the broad Morgan and Dallas Fed
indices record a much stronger nominal appre-
ciation of the dollar up to the first quarter 1985,
and a much weaker subsequent depreciation,
than does the narrow Morgan index. The nomi-
nal Dallas Fed index in particular records an
almost insignificant depreciation in the value of
the dollar since 1985.
Chart 1 also shows that the addition of just two
high inflation countries (Mexico and Brazil,
which account for 7.5 percent of u.s. trade) to
the narrow Morgan index eliminates a large por-
tion ofthe gap withthe broad indices. This
adjustment illustrates the extent to which the
gap between the broad and narrow indices is
caused by the impact ofcountries with high
inflation rates. The broad nominal indices
should therefore be interpreted with caution.
The real versions ofthe indices, which reflect
adjustments for inflation, are illustrated in Chart
2. The gap between the narrow and broad bilat-
eral indices ofthe dollar in the 1980s has been
much narrower than the nominal indices would
suggest. In fact, the correlation in the percent
changes in each pair of the three real indices
between 1976 and 1986 is approximately 90
percent or higher.
Furthermore, the two broad indices show that
the real depreciation of the dollar since 1985
has been significantly stronger than indicated byChart 1






their nominal versions in Chart 1. For example,
up to the third quarter of 1986, the real Dallas
Fed Index shows that the dollar had reversed 47
percent of its appreciation in the 1980s - much
larger than the 9 percent reversal recorded by
the nominal version of the same index.
Nevertheless, the narrow real Morgan index still
shows a much steeper depreciation than do the
broad indices. From the first quarter of 1985, to
the third quarter of 1986, the real Dallas Fed
index shows a depreciation of 13 percent, com-
pared to 18 percent for the broad real Morgan
index and 23 percent for the narrow real Mor-
gan index.
A full assessment of the potential implications of
these alternative measures for the volume of
U.S. trade requires econometric analysis of u.s.
trade flows using these alternative indices.
However, the orders of magnitude involved may
be illustrated by assuming that u.s. imports fall,
and u.s. exports rise, V3 of a percent for every
percent depreciation in the real value ofthe u.s.
dollar.
Given a real annualized level of u.s. imports of
goods and services of $541 billion and exports
of $385 billion (both in 1982 dollars) in the
fourth quarter of 1986, the Dallas Fed index
would predict an improvement in net exports
that is approximately $30 billion smaller than
that predicted by the narrow Morgan index for
the dollar. The broad Morgan index would pre-
dict an improvement in net exports that is $15
billion smaller than the narrow Morgan index.
(Because we have assumed that the impact of
changes in the. dollar on trade flows is the same
for all indices, the differences using the alterna-
tive indices may be smaller than indicated
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potentially large amounts are involved.) It is
unclear which ofthe indices provides the most
accurate measure of u.s. competitiveness, and,
in particular, which ofthe two broad indices
best represents the effects of LDCs on u.S. trade.
Conclusion
The inclusion ofthe currencies of LDCs with
high rates of inflation in broad nominal indices
of the dollar may give a misleading picture of
u.S. competitiveness. As a result, such broad
nominal indices of the dollar should be inter-
preted with caution. In particular, there has been
a significant improvement in U.s. competitive-
ness since the dollar's peak in 1985, contrary to
what may have been inferred from the discus-
sion of the nominal Dallas Fed index in the
media. By all measures, the u.s. trade balance
should improve.
However, when adjustments are made for infla-
tion, the broad real dollar indices still indicate a
smaller dollar depreciation since 1985 than does
a narrow index that excludes LDCs. "Back-of-
the-envelope" calculations suggest that the
improvement in U.S. competitiveness and in the
trade balance indicated by the broad indices
may be much smaller than that indicated by
conventional narrow indices of the dollar.
Since there are many difficulties associated with
gathering data from LDCs, it is not possible to
say that the broad indices of the dollar will con-
sistently provide a better measure of u.s. com-
petitiveness than will the narrow indices. It is
also more difficult to make the broad indices
available on a timely basis. However, the broad
indices do provide a useful point of comparison
in attempting to establish the future likely path
ofthe U.S. trade balance.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 206,197 - 936 3,029 1.4
Loans and Leases1 6 185,135 - 915 1,441 0.7
Commercial and Industrial 54,960 335 1,594 2.9
Real estate 67,201 141 1,232 1.8
Loans to Individuals 38,481 - 76 - 2,000 - 4.9
Leases 5,488 - 7 - 141 - 2.5
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 13,938 18 2,821 25.3
OtherSecurities2 7,123 - 40 - 1,235 - 14.7
Total Deposits 209,101 3,782 6,711 3.3
Demand Deposits 53,724 3,075 5,589 11.6
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 36,349 616 - 7,407 - 16.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,626 799 4,391 28.8
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,751 - 92 - 3,270 - 2.3
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 46,896 - 57 1,295 2.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000ormore 32,387 - 253 - 6,716 - 17.1
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 24,474 - 2,201 - 2,130 - 8.0
TwoWeekAverages
ofDaily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency (- l
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.5. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephonetransfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange